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1 Introduction
An important goal for public policy is to promote equality of opportunity, to let individual
success be determined by merit rather than by social background. Assessing whether
public intervention succeeds at leveling the playing field among citizens thus represents
a key issue for policy evaluation. But what criterion should be used to conduct such
an evaluation? Unfortunately, while an abundant literature has been devoted to define
equality of opportunity, it offers little guidance for assessing how far a given distribution
is from the equality of opportunity goal. The contribution of this paper is to define
a theoretical criterion of equalization of opportunity, understood as a reduction in the
extent of inequality of opportunity, and to apply this criterion to policy evaluation.
Theories of equality of opportunity (EOP) draw a distinction between fair inequality,
arising from differences in individual effort, and unfair inequality arising from differences
in individual circumstances, i.e. the determinants of success for which society deems the
individual not to be responsible (Dworkin 1981, Roemer 1998, Fleurbaey 2008). Define a
type as a given set of circumstances, and an opportunity set as the set of feasible outcomes
for each type. The EOP principle requires that no type is advantaged compared to other
types in the sense of having access to a more favorable opportunity set. This principle
allows to assess whether a given distribution satisfies equality of opportunity. However, it
does not allow to compare two societies where equality of opportunity is not satisfied. This
is an important limitation in many contexts, including policy evaluation and comparisons
of inequality across time and space.
To address this limitation, some authors have relied on scalar indices of inequality of
opportunity.1 While consistent with the EOP principles, this approach raises concerns
1For an overview of this approach, see Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) and Ferreira and Peragine (2016).
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of robustness as it relies on two restrictive assumptions. First, it requires summarizing
the advantage enjoyed by a type in a scalar measure, e.g. the mean income conditional
on type.2 But these scalar measures may mask important features of the distribution of
opportunity. Second, the index approach relies on specific welfare functions to aggregate
differences in advantage between types. Therefore, it draws on specific a priori preference
orderings that may violate the preferences of individuals in society. As a result, inequality
of opportunity indices often lack robustness and generality.
Our main contribution is to alleviate these shortcomings and to develop a robust
criterion that allows comparing different societies according to their degree of inequality
of opportunity. We characterize a society by the opportunity sets it offers to each type.
Endowed with her own preferences, each individual in society is able to compare the
opportunity sets of the different types. Our equalization of opportunity (EZOP) criterion
states that “Inequality of opportunity is higher in social state 0 than in social state 1”, if
and only if all individuals in society, regardless of their preferences, agree that the unfair
advantage enjoyed by the “privileged” types is lower in state 1 than in state 0, where
different states might correspond to different countries, time periods or policy regimes.
Contrary to the index approach, our criterion does not rely on a priori value functions
to assess the advantage enjoyed by each type. Instead, we use the potential preferences
over opportunity sets of individuals in society and allow for heterogeneity in these pref-
erences. This raises an important issue of identification. In practice, we only observe
(at best) the opportunity sets of each type but not individual preferences. Hence it is
not feasible to verify for each particular preference whether the advantage of privileged
For examples, see Bourguignon, Ferreira and Menendez (2007), Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008),
Checchi and Peragine (2010), Alm˚as, Cappelen, Lind, Sørensen and Tungodden (2011), Bjo¨rklund, Ja¨ntti
and Roemer (2012) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).
2This amounts to assume that individuals are risk neutral, with respect to within-type uncertainty.
Lefranc et al. (2008) assume risk aversion but rely on specific preferences.
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types is lower in one particular state. Instead, we would like to define a tractable con-
dition, involving the distribution of opportunity sets alone, that would imply that our
equalization criterion is satisfied. We show that such a condition can be defined using
the tools of stochastic dominance. Of course, this can be achieved only within a specified
family of preferences. In this paper, we focus mainly on the rank-dependent representa-
tion of preferences (Yaari 1987), although the analysis can be adapted to other classes of
preferences.
The robustness and generality of our ranking criterion rests on the requirement of
a consensus across individuals in their comparison of social states. We investigate the
existence of such a consensus and show that our identification condition can be applied
only when individuals agree on the ranking of types in each social state, i.e. when
individuals agree on which types are advantaged. If individuals disagree, they cannot
unanimously agree on equalization of opportunity. It is possible, however, to identify
subclasses of preferences within which individuals agree on the ranking of types in each
state, and to single out necessary and sufficient conditions for equalization within these
subclasses of preferences.3 Our criterion is demanding in requiring that equalization
occurs for each pairwise comparison of a possibly large number of types. We discuss how
it can be relaxed by allowing the advantage of each type to be aggregated within society.
We also discuss the consequences of imperfectly observing the relevant determinants of
outcome for the implementation of our equalization criterion.
Finally, we show the usefulness of our framework by applying it to the evaluation
of child care policy in Norway. In this respect, we also contribute to the literature on
3Aaberge, Havnes and Mogstad (2014) propose a robust welfarist criterion for ranking income dis-
tributions, based on unanimous agreement between subclasses of evaluation functions admitting the
rank-dependent representation.
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early childhood investments.4 We follow Havnes and Mogstad (2011, 2015) in consider-
ing how the introduction of universally available child care in Norway affected children’s
adult earnings. To estimate counterfactual distributions, we estimate quantile treatment
effects, exploiting the spatial and temporal variation of the expansion in a difference-in-
differences setup. We allow impacts across the distribution to vary flexibly with family
background. Overall, our results suggest that the child care expansion significantly equal-
ized opportunities between children from most, though not all, family backgrounds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses equalization of
opportunity in a simplified setting with two types. Next, section 3 considers the general
case with multiple levels of effort and circumstances. Finally, section 4 presents the
application.
2 Equalization of opportunity: a simplified setting
In this section, we define equality of opportunity and provide a formal statement of our
equalization criterion in a simplified setting. Next, we discuss identification conditions.
2.1 Definition of equality of opportunity
Let y ∈ R+ denote an individual outcome, and let the determinants of the outcome be
partitioned into four groups: Circumstances capture determinants that are not considered
legitimate sources of inequality, and are denoted by c. Effort captures determinants
that are considered legitimate sources of inequality, and is denoted by e. Luck captures
factors that are considered legitimate sources of inequality as long as they affect individual
outcomes in a neutral way given circumstances and effort, and is denoted by l.5 Finally,
4For surveys, see Almond and Currie (2011), Ruhm and Waldfogel (2012), or Baker (2011).
5For a discussion of the ethical basis that serves to substantiate each of these three classes of deter-
minants see Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009) and Lefranc and Trannoy (2017).
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outcomes are contingent on a binary social state, denoted pi. All individuals in a society
share the social state, but may be affected differently. For instance, pi = 0 may denote
society without a specific policy intervention, while pi = 1 denotes society with the policy,
or pi may indicate different periods or countries that one would like to compare.
Let a type denote the set of individuals sharing similar circumstances. Given their
type, level of effort and the social state, the opportunity set offered to individuals can
be summarized by the cumulative distribution function Fpi(y|c, e), or equivalently by its
conditional quantile function F−1pi (p|c, e), for all ranks p in [0,1].6
EOP theories emphasize that inequality due to differences in circumstances is morally
or politically objectionable, while inequality originating from differences in effort is legit-
imate. Based on this principle, equality of opportunity requires that the opportunity sets
of individuals with similar effort be identical regardless of circumstances. Hence, for a
given social state pi, EOP requires that, for any effort e, for any pair of circumstances
(c, c′), and for every y, we have:
Fpi(y|c, e) = Fpi(y|c′, e). (1)
This condition embodies the core of the equality of opportunity principle, as discussed
for instance in Roemer (1998), Lefranc et al. (2009) and Roemer and Trannoy (2014).7
6If the cumulative distribution function is only left continuous, we define F−1pi by the left continuous
inverse distribution of Fpi: F
−1
pi (p|c, e) = inf{y ∈ R+ : Fpi(y|c, e) ≥ p}, with p ∈ [0, 1].
7This condition embodies the compensation principle advocated in Roemer (1998). It takes a neu-
tral stance with respect to inequalities stemming from fair sources of outcome and does not resort
to an additional reward principle that would further restrain the definition of equality of opportunity
(Fleurbaey 2008).
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2.2 A criterion for equalization of opportunity
Ranking social states The previous definition can be used to rank social states. The
empirical analysis in Lefranc et al. (2009) builds on this idea. However, it distinguishes
only between states where EOP is satisfied and states where EOP is not satisfied, which
leads to a very partial ranking.
In order to obtain a less partial ranking, various authors have resorted to specific
inequality indices in order to quantify the degree of inequality of opportunity in a given
social state.8These inequality measures embody specific social preferences with respect
to inequality between types and to the within-type dispersion of outcomes. Inequality
of opportunity indices have two main limitations. First, they lack generality, as each
index relies on specific parametric formulations of social preferences. Second, they embed
specific preferences of the social planner that agree with the EOP principles but might
violate individual preferences over outcomes.
Our objective is to provide a robust criterion that allows comparing social states
in situations where EOP is not satisfied. The intuition behind our ranking criterion
is the following. If EOP is not satisfied, then individuals are not indifferent between
the opportunity sets offered to different types. Behind a thin veil of ignorance, where
individuals know their effort and have preferences over opportunity sets, everyone should
be able to rank circumstances according to the economic advantage or disadvantage that
they confer. Our criterion for ranking social states is based on the evaluation of the
extent of the economic advantage enjoyed by the advantaged types in society. To ensure
robustness, our equalization of opportunity criterion (EZOP) requires unanimity across
all admissible preferences in society, in assessing that the unfair advantage attached to
8See Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) and Ferreira and Peragine (2016) for a survey.
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more favorable circumstances decreases.
For expositional purposes, we start by formalizing the equalization criterion in a
simplified setting with only two types, c and c′, who exert a common effort level e. To
simplify notation, we let Fpi(.) (resp. F
′
pi(.)) denote the cdf of y for type c (resp. c
′) at effort
e in policy state pi, i.e. Fpi(.|c, e) (resp. Fpi(.|c′, e)). Section 3 provides a generalization
with many types and effort levels.
The EZOP criterion We assume that each individual is endowed with cardinal pref-
erences over risky outcomes. Let W (F ) denote the utility of a lottery with cumulative
distribution F , and let P denote the class of individual preferences. For an individual
with preferences W ∈ P , the economic advantage or disadvantage of type c relative to
type c′ in social state pi is denoted ∆W (Fpi, F ′pi) ≡ W (Fpi) − W (F ′pi). This quantity is
positive if the individual with preferences W prefers Fpi to F
′
pi, while it is equal to zero if
EOP holds between types c and c′. We refer to the absolute value of the welfare gap as
the economic distance between types according to preferences W .9
The equalization of opportunity criterion rests on the difference in economic advantage
across social states, as captured by the following definition:
Definition 1 (EZOP: equalization of opportunity between two types) Moving from
state pi = 0 to pi = 1 equalizes opportunity between circumstances c and c′, at effort
e on the set of preferences P, if and only if, for all preferences W ∈ P, we have:
|∆W (F0, F ′0)| ≥ |∆W (F1, F ′1)|.
The equalization of opportunity criterion defines a social ordering requiring unanimity
among potential individual preferences. It has several key properties that are worth
9For a discussion, see Chakravarty and Dutta (1987).
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emphasizing. First, in line with the theory of EOP, ranking state 1 above state 0 requires
that the unfair economic advantage enjoyed by the privileged type be smaller in state
1 than in 0. Second, the criterion satisfies an anonymity condition with respect of the
identity of the advantaged type: Only the absolute value of the economic advantage, but
not its sign, should matter for assessing equalization of opportunity. Third, it requires
that the ranking be robust to a broad class of individual preferences. Fourth, in line
with most of the inequality literature, the EZOP criterion focuses only on the difference
in welfare across types and not on the level of welfare in each social state. This view
implies that an overall reduction in aggregate welfare in society could lead to a reduction
in inequality of opportunity, provided that the welfare gaps across types also falls. To
address such cases, the EZOP criterion can be complemented by further requiring that
average welfare or the welfare of the worse-off type does not fall when moving from state
0 to state 1.10 Last, our EZOP criterion takes into account the absolute welfare gap
between types. As a complement to this absolute perspective, a relative view can be
developed by focusing on the distribution of income shares across types, as discussed in
section 3.2 below.
2.3 Identification under the rank-dependent utility model
The identification problem The EZOP criterion is contingent on the choice of the
class of preferences P . If the set of individual preferences W in society was known, we
could directly check whether the equalization condition holds. In practice, we know only
10Peragine (2002) offers an alternative criterion that focuses on social welfare improvement, in a sequen-
tial way, by giving priority to welfare gains for the least privileged types. This criterion is not consistent
with the EZOP criterion in Definition 1. Assume that F ′0 = F
′
1 and W (F1) > W (F0) > W (F
′
0) for
every preference W ∈ P. Moving from pi = 0 to pi = 1 satisfies the sequential dominance criterion as
the welfare of the lowest type stays unchanged and the welfare of the lowest two types (i.e. the entire
population) improves. Yet in state pi = 1 the welfare gap between types has increased hence rejecting
EZOP.
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the outcome distributions under the two policy states but not individual preferences.
Therefore, the condition in definition 1 cannot be directly assessed.
To make the equalization criterion relevant, we need to reformulate it in terms of
a restriction that involves only the outcome distributions of the different types in the
alternative states. This cannot be achieved without imposing restrictions on the class P
of individual preferences. Two possible alternative representations of preferences under
risk have been widely studied and adopted in decision theory: The expected utility model
and the rank-dependent model of Yaari (1987). In the rest of the paper, we focus on the
rank-dependent class, which we denote by R.11 In the rest of this section we concentrate
on the following question: What minimal conditions need to be imposed on the set of
distributions F0, F
′
0, F1, F
′
1 to ensure that equalization is satisfied for all preferences in R?
The rank-dependent model assumes that the welfare derived from a risky distribution
F can be written as a weighted average of all possible realizations, where the weights are
a function of the rank of the realization in the distribution of outcomes. Formally, let
w(p) ≥ 0 denote the weight assigned to the outcome at percentile p. The welfare derived
from F can then be written as:12
W (F ) =
∫
R+
w(F (y))ydy =
∫ 1
0
w(p)F−1(p)dp.
11In addition to their tractability in empirical evaluations, the rank-dependent family of preferences
resolves important paradoxes in the theory of choice under risk (see e.g. Allais 1953, Kahneman and
Tversky 1979, Quiggin 1981). It also has a unique position in empirical welfare analysis in providing
theoretical underpinnings for the widely used Gini index (see e.g. Sen 1974). Our framework is not
confined, however, to the rank-dependent family, and could be extended to other families of preferences.
For instance, equalization conditions can be derived for the class of Von Neumann expected utility
preferences. The online appendix provides such conditions under first order dominance.
12Formally, one requires that w(p) ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1] and w˜(p) = ∫ p
0
w(t)dt ∈ [0, 1] is such that w˜(1) = 1.
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Under the rank-dependent model, the economic distance between types is given by:
|∆W (F, F ′)| = |
∫ 1
0
w(p)
(
F−1(p)− F ′−1(p)) dp| = | ∫ 1
0
w(p)Γ(F, F ′, p)dp|, (2)
where Γ(F, F ′, p) is the cumulative distribution gap between F and F ′. We refer to the
graph of Γ(., ., .) as the gap curve and to the graph of |Γ(., ., .)| as the absolute gap curve.
Necessary condition for EZOP From equation (2), a necessary condition for EZOP is
that the cumulative distribution gap under pi = 1 be smaller, in absolute value, compared
to the gap under pi = 0, at all percentiles. We refer to this as absolute gap curve
dominance of pi = 1 over pi = 0.
Proposition 1 EZOP is satisfied on the set of preferencesR⇒ ∀p ∈ [0, 1], |Γ(F1, F ′1, p)| ≤
|Γ(F0, F ′0, p)|.
Proofs of this and subsequent propositions are given in the online supplemental ap-
pendix, section A. The intuition of the proof is that if the absolute gap curve increases,
there always exists a preference in R for which the unfair economic advantage increases.
Note that absolute gap curve dominance is not a sufficient condition for EZOP. Whether
a reduction in the gap between type c and c′ amounts to a reduction in advantage, will
depend on which of the two groups is considered to be advantaged. Because the assess-
ment of which type is advantaged may differ over the set of possible preferences, the
requirement for EZOP over all possible preferences must be stronger than what is im-
posed by absolute gap curve dominance. For instance, assume that the distribution of
type c dominates the distribution of type c′ over some interval. This does not imply,
in the general case, that type c dominates c′ over the entire support of the distribution.
Henceforth, some preferences might rank c′ better than c. Now assume that gap curve
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dominance is satisfied over this interval and that gap curves are similar in both social
states otherwise. In this case, preferences that rank c′ better than c will conclude that
the cardinal advantage of c′ has increased. This contradicts EZOP.
Necessary and sufficient condition under stochastic dominance A corollary of
this discussion is that if individuals agree on the ranking of types, they should also agree
in their ranking of social states under gap curve dominance. We now examine this case.
As discussed in Muliere and Scarsini (1989), among others, unanimity in ranking
distributions Fpi better than F
′
pi will be achieved for all preferences in R if and only if
distribution Fpi stochastically dominates distribution F
′
pi. This is equivalent to requiring
inverse stochastic dominance at order one, which we denote Fpi ISD1 F ′pi. This holds
whenever the graph of F−1pi lies above the graph of F
′−1
pi .
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In this section, we assume that this condition is satisfied.14 If so, all preferences in R
unanimously rank type c better than type c′. A fall in the cumulative distribution gap then
has unambiguous consequences for the change in the economic distance between types.
In fact, since the sign of the cumulative distribution gap is constant across all percentiles,
the economic distance can be expressed as an increasing function of the absolute income
gap: |∆W (F, F ′)| =
∫ 1
0
w(p)|Γ(F, F ′, p)|dp. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If ∀pi Fpi ISD1 F ′pi then: EZOP over the set of preferences R ⇔ ∀p ∈
[0, 1], Γ(F0, F
′
0, p) ≥ Γ(F1, F ′1, p).
This proposition establishes that when individuals agree on the ranking of types, gap
13Note that stochastic dominance and inverse stochastic dominance are equivalent at the first and
second order. The difference is that the dominance condition in the latter case is expressed in the space
of realizations (through the quantile function) while in the former case it is expressed in the space of
probabilities (through the cdf).
14Since c and c′ play a symmetric role in the definition of EZOP, which type dominates the other
is irrelevant. Hence we make the neutral assumption that the distribution of type c dominates the
distribution of type c′, under both policy regimes.
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curve dominance provides a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP. This contrasts
with the situation where preferences do not agree on the ranking of types, in which
case gap curve dominance provides only a necessary condition for EZOP. In order to
evaluate EZOP in such situations, we next consider refinements on the admissible set of
preferences.
Restricted consensus on EZOP When types cannot be ranked unambiguously, the
cumulative distribution gap is no longer sufficient to infer EZOP. Our objective is to
identify the minimal refinement on the set of admissible preferences that allows unam-
biguous assessments of equalization of opportunity. In line with Aaberge et al. (2014),
we show that it is always possible to find a subset of R over which individuals agree
on the ranking of types. Furthermore, on this subset, one can establish a necessary and
sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity.
Let us first consider the special case where Fpi second order stochastic dominates F
′
pi
for all pi ∈ {0, 1}, which we denote Fpi ISD2 F ′pi. This holds whenever the graph of the
integral of F−1pi with respect to p (the Generalized Lorenz curve) lies above the graph
of the corresponding integral of F ′−1pi . Define R2 ⊂ R as the set of risk-averse rank-
dependent preferences.15 As is well known, all risk averse preferences rank distribution
functions consistently with second order dominance. It follows that all preferences in R2
will rank type c better than c′ in both states. Furthermore, the advantage of c over c′
can be expressed as an increasing function of the integral of the cumulative distribution
gap. Analogous to the above, a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP over the
set of preferences R2 is then that the integrated cumulative distribution gap falls at all
percentiles. This is established in the following proposition:
15This set contains all evaluation functions with weights decreasing in outcomes, i.e. that have w′(p) <
0.
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Proposition 3 If ∀pi Fpi ISD2 F ′pi then: EZOP over the set of preferences R2 ⇔ ∀p ∈
[0, 1],
∫ p
0
Γ(F0, F
′
0, t)dt ≥
∫ p
0
Γ(F1, F
′
1, t)dt
Finally, consider the case where distributions cannot be ranked by second order dom-
inance. In this case, consensus over the ranking of types cannot be reached in the class
R2. However, it is possible to refine the set of preferences to where they agree on the
ranking of types. Following Aaberge (2009), consider the subset of preferences Rk defined
by:
Rk =
{
W ∈ R | (−1)i−1 · d
iw˜(p)
dpi
≥ 0, d
iw˜(1)
dpi
= 0 ∀p ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, . . . , k
}
,
where w˜(p) =
∫ p
0
w(t)dt is the cumulative weighting scheme. The sequence of subsets of
the type Rk defines a nested partition of R where Rk ⊂ Rk−1 ⊂ ... ⊂ R.16
Various papers have examined the relationship between inverse stochastic dominance
and the ordering of distributions according to preferences in Rk (Muliere and Scarsini
1989, Zoli 2002). Aaberge et al. (2014) provide a general treatment and show that for
any order k all preferences in Rk will prefer Fpi over F ′pi if and only if Fpi inverse stochastic
dominates F ′pi at order k. Furthermore, as we show in the online appendix, any pair of
distributions can always be ranked by inverse stochastic dominance, for a sufficiently high
finite order. Define κ as the minimal order at which Fpi and F
′
pi can be ranked using inverse
stochastic dominance in both states, and denote kth order inverse stochastic dominance
by ISDk. Without loss of generality, assume that Fpi ISDκ F ′pi for all pi ∈ {0, 1}, such
that preferences in Rκ agree on the ranking of types in both states.17
16Note that k is a measure of the effect of a precise sequence of restrictions on all possible cumulative
weighting schemes w˜(p) defined on R. Hence, k indicates the risk attitude of preferences contained in
Rk.
17A larger κ reduces preference heterogeneity in Rκ, making ranking agreement more likely, yet less
robust. Also note that order k inverse stochastic dominance implies order k + 1 dominance.
14
To proceed, it is helpful to introduce the following notation:
Λ2pi(p) =
∫ p
0
F−1pi (t)dt and Λ
k
pi(p) =
∫ p
0
Λk−1pi (t)dt, for k = 3, 4, . . .
For notational simplicity, we let Λ′kpi denote Λ
k
pi evaluated over the distribution F
′
pi rather
than Fpi. With these notations, inverse stochastic dominance of order k is defined
as Λkpi(p) > Λ
′k
pi (p) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. In line with the notation above, also define
Γk(Fpi, F
′
pi, p) = Λ
k
pi(p) − Λ′kpi (p) as the cumulative distribution gap integrated at order
k − 1.
If, for all pi ∈ {0, 1}, Fpi ISDκ F ′pi, then for all preferences W ∈ Rκ the advantage
of type c over type c′ under policy pi is an increasing function of Γκ(Fpi, F ′pi, p). As a
consequence, EZOP will be satisfied on the set of preferencesRκ if and only if Γκ(Fpi, F ′pi, p)
is smaller under pi = 1 than under pi = 0. This is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If ∀pi Fpi ISDκ F ′pi then: EZOP over the set of preferences Rκ ⇔ ∀p ∈
[0, 1], Γκ(F0, F
′
0, p) ≥ Γκ(F1, F ′1, p).
Proposition 4 establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP under a less
stringent dominance condition than in propositions 2 and 3. At the same time, the set of
preferences over which it allows to identify EZOP is more restrictive. Finally, since there
always exists an integer κ that allows ranking types, proposition 4 establishes a necessary
condition for EZOP over the entire class R.
2.4 Discussion
Several features of our equalization criterion are worth discussing further. First, our
criterion relies on the individuals’ own preferences, rather than on an external social
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welfare function. This is consistent with the no-envy criterion (Fleurbaey 2008), which
requires that individuals with given preferences and effort be indifferent between the
opportunity sets of the different types. Hence, the advantage enjoyed by privileged types
represents a measure of the degree of envy, for given preferences. Second, the criterion is
general, in the sense that it does not place any restriction on the preferences of individuals.
The degree of heterogeneity of preferences across the population is clearly unobservable.
The focus is therefore on the class of potential preferences these individuals may have.
Third, the criterion does not in itself require that individuals agree on the ranking of
types, only that they agree on the reduction in the absolute gap between the different
types. In other words, our criterion requires a consensus on the reduction of the advantage
but not on the identity of the advantaged type. Finally, the criterion does not require
summarizing the opportunity sets of the different types by a scalar measure as is often
done in the literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity.
The results obtained under the rank-dependent assumption also call for further com-
ments. They lead us to distinguish between two cases. The case where individuals agree
on the ranking of types under each social state is straightforward, as proposition 2 pro-
vides a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity. In the case
where individuals do not agree on the ranking of types, however, proposition 1 provides
a necessary condition for equalization. Violation of this condition rules out equalization.
Otherwise, proposition 4 allows one to endogenously identify a restricted set of prefer-
ences over which unanimity might be reached regarding equalization of opportunity. Of
course, this only provides a partial judgment over equalization of opportunity. In fact,
the higher the order of κ required to successfully rank opportunity sets, the less general
the judgment will be.
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The restrictions on preferences required to achieve a consensus on the ranking of
types may however be more directly informative. When weak restrictions are required
to achieve a consistent ranking, then most individuals should agree on which type is
advantaged. On the contrary, when stronger restrictions are required, there may be
widespread disagreement on which type is advantaged. In this case, one might argue that
a weak form of equality of opportunity already prevails. Lefranc et al. (2009) introduce
the notion of weak equality of opportunity to single out situations where the opportunity
sets differ across types but cannot be ranked unanimously among agents with risk-averse
preferences. By capturing the degree of consensus about the advantaged type among
potential preferences, κ helps generalize this notion of weak equality of opportunity.
To summarize, when there may be widespread disagreement on which type is advan-
taged (high κ), our criterion provides a very partial condition for consensus on equaliza-
tion of opportunity, although this admittedly corresponds to a case of weak inequality of
opportunity. On the contrary, when there is large agreement on which type is advantaged
(low κ), our equalization condition becomes least partial and turns into a necessary and
sufficient condition for EZOP in the case where there is full consensus on the identity of
the advantaged type (κ = 1).
3 Equalization of opportunity: generalization
In the general case, opportunity equalization has to be assessed with more than two
circumstances, across many effort levels. When effort is observable, one possibility is to
extend the EZOP comparisons to all pairs of circumstances at every effort level, or to
study meaningful aggregations of these judgements. We discuss both extensions in this
section. Identification criteria when effort is not observable are also discussed, in order to
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provide relevant notions of equalization that can still be used in applied analysis, under
observability constraints.
3.1 Extending the EZOP criterion to multiple circumstances
We consider the case in which there are T types. Let C = {c1, ..., ci, ...cT} denote the set
of possible circumstances. For simplicity, we assume a single effort level e. The results of
this section can be easily extended to multiple effort levels (see section 3.3).
A straightforward extension of definition 1 to multiple circumstances is to require that
for every possible pair of circumstances, the unfair gap falls when moving from social state
pi = 0 to pi = 1. This is given by the following definition.
Definition 2 (EZOP between multiple types) Moving from state pi = 0 to pi = 1
equalizes opportunity over the set of circumstances C, at effort e, on the set of preferences
P, if and only if, for all preferences W ∈ P, for all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , T}2, we have:
|∆W (F0(.|ci, e), F0(.|cj, e))| ≥ |∆W (F1(.|ci, e), F1(.|cj, e))|.
Again, this generalized form of EZOP cannot be verified in practice without specifying
the class of preferences. In the class R, the results of propositions 2 and 4 generalize
easily to the multivariate case. For every pair (i, j), let κij denote the minimal order at
which Fpi(.|ci, e) and Fpi(.|cj, e) can be ranked according to inverse stochastic dominance,
for all pi. According to proposition 4, integrated gap curve dominance for each pair of
types ci and cj provides a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP between the two
types over the subclass Rκij . This condition is, however, only necessary for the whole
class R.
Proposition 5 EZOP between multiple types over the set of preferences R ⇒ ∀(i, j) ∈
{1, . . . , T}, ∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∣∣Γκij (F0(.|ci, e), F0(.|cj, e), p) ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣Γκij (F1(.|ci, e), F1(.|cj, e), p) ∣∣.
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The proof is based on the same arguments used in the proof of proposition 4. Differently
from this proposition, while we know that Fpi(.|ci, e) and Fpi(.|cj, e) can be ranked at
the order of dominance κij, the direction of dominance is a priori undetermined. This
explains why gap dominance should hold in absolute value.
Definition 2 makes the “identity” of each type relevant for defining equalization of
opportunity, since the extent of advantage between any pair of types (ci, cj) under pi = 0
is compared with the extent of advantage between the same two types under pi = 1. One
may challenge this view and claim that only the magnitude of the gaps (and not the
identity of the types involved) is relevant for defining equalization of opportunity. One
way to implement this idea is through anonymous criteria of equalization between multiple
types, where the type label is replaced with the type rank in the order of advantage. We
formally develop these criteria and provide testable implications in the online appendix.
3.2 Aggregation across circumstances
Definition 2 is demanding and may fail to be satisfied empirically, as it requires that
the welfare gap falls for every pair from a possibly large number of types. As a result,
the EZOP criterion allows only a partial ordering of social states. Furthermore, it might
be argued that a small increase in the opportunity gap between two types might be
compensated by a fall in the opportunity gap between another pair of types. This suggests
aggregating welfare gaps across pairs of circumstances into a scalar measure.
Such aggregation requires selecting two value functions. The first function, W , eval-
uates the opportunities available to each type. The second function, V , aggregates the
welfare levels across types into a single value of social welfare. For a pair of functions V
and W , one can define an Inequality of Opportunity indicator (IO
V
W
) for each social state
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pi:
IO
V
W
(pi) = V
(
W (Fpi(.|c1, e)) , . . . ,W (Fpi(.|cT , e))
)
(3)
Restrictions have to be imposed on V in order to obtain a scalar measure that is con-
sistent with the EZOP principle defined in the previous section. Note that, for a specific
function W , the inequality condition that appears in definition 2 amounts to requesting
that the vector of type-specific welfare levels in state pi = 1, (W (F1(.|c1, e)) , . . . ,W (F1(.|cT , e)))
can be obtained from the same vector in state pi = 0, by applying a series of progressive
Pigou-Dalton welfare transfers and, possibly, a lump-sum welfare transfer to all types.
This implies that the function V should be consistent with the Pigou-Dalton transfers
principle and translation invariant. Hence, up to an increasing transformation, the func-
tion V should be an absolute inequality index (Moyes 1987).
Our Inequality of Opportunity indicator is thus a measure of between-types welfare
inequality, computed on the basis of a specific function W , using an absolute inequality
index. If EZOP is satisfied for a particular W , then IO
IA
W
(1) ≤ IOIA
W
(0) for any absolute
inequality index, denoted IA.
As an example, consider the function V associated with the absolute Gini coefficient
(Chakravarty 1988), which is simply the standard Gini coefficient multiplied by the mean.
When types have different relative frequencies in the population, pc, a natural extension
is to account for type frequency when computing between-type inequality. This yields
the following inequality of opportunity indicator:
IO
Gini
W
(pi) =
T−1∑
i=1
T∑
j=i+1
pci pcj
∣∣W (Fpi(.|ci, e))−W (Fpi(.|cj, e)) ∣∣. (4)
IO
Gini
W
equals the average absolute welfare gap, across all pairs of circumstances, computed
20
for function W .
Equations (3) and (4) encompass several inequality of opportunity indices suggested
in the literature. Lefranc et al. (2008) introduce the Gini Opportunity index defined as:
GO(pi) =
1
µ
T−1∑
i=1
T∑
j=i+1
pci pcj
∣∣µci(1−Gci) − µcj(1−Gcj)∣∣.
The index is obtained from IOGiniW by plugging in the functionW (Fpi(.|c, e)) = µcµ (1−Gc),
where µc/µ is the ratio between the mean outcome conditional on circumstance c and
the population mean, while Gc is the Gini coefficient for type c. Alternatively, using the
function W (Fpi(.|c, e)) = µcµ in (4) yields the inter-type relative Gini coefficient.18
The indices introduced in Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux
(2011) can also be seen as special cases of equation (3). Both papers suggest measur-
ing inequality of opportunity by applying a standard inequality index I to the smoothed
income distribution, i.e. the income distribution where individual incomes are replaced
by the type-specific mean incomes. Hence, their inequality index can be written as
I (µc1 , . . . , µcT ). In terms of the notation in equation (3), this implies that the function
V is replaced by a standard inequality index. Since both papers advocate using relative
inequality indices, one may worry that this produces inequality indices that are not con-
sistent with the EZOP criterion. However, note that in the case of relative inequality
indices we have: I (µc1 , . . . , µcT ) = I
(
µc1
µ
, . . . ,
µcT
µ
)
. Thus, one can view the inequality
of opportunity indices of Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)
as relying on the relative type-specific mean income to evaluate the expected welfare, W ,
of any type. Furthermore, one should stress that this specific measure of welfare has a
constant mean equal to one, in each state. Hence, for such an evaluation function W ,
18For a complete survey of Gini-type indices for equality of opportunity sets, see Weymark (2003).
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requesting that the function V is translation invariant is irrelevant and we can simply
request that V is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle, which is indeed satisfied
by any relative inequality index I. An important implication of this discussion is that
a relative approach to inequality of opportunity can be developed, within the setting of
this paper, by applying the gap curve dominance criterion to the mean-normalized in-
come distributions. This allows generalizing the relative inequality of opportunity indices
introduced in the literature.19
3.3 Aggregation in the effort dimension
Let us now consider a situation where effort can be summarized by a scalar indicator
e ∈ R+. We refer to the distribution of effort within a type as G(e|c, pi).
Assume first that effort is realized and observable. This corresponds to what has been
referred to in the EOP literature as an ex post situation (Fleurbaey and Peragine 2013).
A straightforward extension of definition 2 to the multiple effort setting can be made by
requiring equalization to hold at every effort level, which can be assessed with ideal data.
In most existing data sets, however, information on effort is missing. In this context,
it is only possible to observe for each type its outcome distribution, given by:
Fpi(y|c) =
∫
E
Fpi(y|c, e)dG(e|c, pi). (5)
In the presence of luck, the distribution of outcome of a given type arises from a mixture
of luck and effort factors.
19Both Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) introduce an alternative measure
of inequality of opportunity, defined as the share of inequality of opportunity in total inequality of
outcome. Note, however, that our EZOP criterion takes into account only between-types inequality and
is insensitive to inequality arising from effort or luck. In the same spirit, however, our inequality of
opportunity indicator could be divided by a measure of welfare inequality.
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The ex-ante approach The distributions Fpi(.|c) are interesting in their own right
and relevant for opportunity equalization. Each distribution captures the opportunity
sets associated to different types in an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the effort choices
are made. If EZOP judgements are made without knowing in advance what individual
effort choices will be, the ex post level of effort could be treated as luck. This amounts to
assuming that all individuals in a type exert similar effort. One may further assume that
effort levels are comparable across types, as discussed below. This comes close in spirit
to the analysis of Van de gaer (1993). In this case, equalization should be decided on the
basis of the outcome distributions of each type, Fpi(y|c):
Definition 3 (Ex ante EZOP between multiple types) Moving from state pi = 0
to pi = 1 equalizes opportunity ex ante over the set of circumstances C on the set of
preferences P if and only if for all preferences W ∈ P, for all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , T}2, we
have: |∆W (F0(.|ci), F0(.|cj))| ≥ |∆W (F1(.|ci), F1(.|cj))|.
According to this definition, opportunities are equalized if preferences agree that the gaps
between the expected opportunity sets associated with every pair of circumstances fall
with the change in social state. When P = R, proposition 5 can be used to identify ex
ante EZOP.20 This suggests using empirical gap curves based on observable distributions,
conditional on circumstances alone, to assess ex ante EZOP.
The relationship between ex ante and ex post EZOP Ex ante and ex post EZOP
correspond to different concepts of equalization. Empirically assessing the ex ante per-
spective is less demanding in terms of data. Yet a key question is whether the ex ante
distributions can also be used to evaluate ex post EZOP.
20In this case, proposition 5 has to be reformulated using distributions of outcomes conditional on cir-
cumstances. A necessary condition for ex-ante EZOP between multiple types is that ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , T},
∀p ∈ [0, 1], ∣∣Γκij (F0(.|ci), F0(.|cj), p) ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣Γκij (F1(.|ci), F1(.|cj), p) ∣∣.
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First consider the Roemerian setting where luck plays no role. Individuals with cir-
cumstances c and effort e in state pi are assigned a single value of outcome Ypi(c, e). Hence,
ex post equalization amounts to require that for all (c, c′) and all e: |Y0(c, e)−Y0(c′, e)| ≥
|Y1(c, e)− Y1(c′, e)|. The Roemerian concept of effort requires, on a priori grounds, that
effort be defined such that its distribution is independent of type.21 Roemer further as-
sumes that the outcome function Ypi(c, e) is strictly increasing in e. In this case, the
individual effort within a type can be identified by the rank in the type-specific outcome
distribution: e ≡ p = Fpi(y|c) and we have Ypi(c, e) = F−1pi (p|c). Ex post EZOP in this
setting is thus equivalent to requiring ex ante absolute gap curve dominance, i.e. for all
p ∈ [0, 1]: |F−10 (p|c)− F−10 (p|c′)| ≥ |F−11 (p|c)− F−11 (p|c′)|. Hence, ex post EZOP can be
tested with ex ante data alone. When the ex ante distributions can be ranked according
to stochastic dominance, we can establish the equivalence between gap curve dominance
and ex ante dominance. This implies that ex ante EZOP is equivalent to ex post EZOP
when types can be ranked ex ante.
Next, let us turn to the general setting where luck and effort distributions are not
degenerate. In this case, the relationship between ex ante and ex post equalization cannot
be established without further assumptions. Consider first a simple example with two
circumstances, c and c′, and many effort levels. Assume that for all effort levels, type
c dominates c′ at the first order. In this case, ex post EZOP requires that for all e,
|F0(y|c, e)−F0(y|c′, e)| ≥ |F1(y|c, e)−F1(y|c′, e)|. Assume further that effort is distributed
independently of type and state. Under these two assumptions, we have, using (5):
|Fpi(y|c) − Fpi(y|c′)| =
∫ |Fpi(y|c, e) − Fpi(y|c′, e)|dG(e). This allows to establish that
21The argument is that since individuals cannot be held responsible for their type, they should not be
held accountable for the association between their “effort” and their type. One may push the argument
further and require that the distribution of effort is also independent of the state. For a complete
discussion of the conditions of identification of equality of opportunity in Roemer’s model, see O’Neill,
Sweetman and Van De Gaer (2000) and Lefranc et al. (2009).
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rejection of ex ante EZOP implies rejection of ex post EZOP. However, this is only valid
under the two maintained assumptions. Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot be
tested empirically, without observing effort. This shows that in the general case, ex post
equalization cannot be identified using ex ante comparisons.
4 Child care expansion and equalization of opportunity in Norway
Recently, policymakers both in the US and in Europe are pushing for expanding access
to child care, in an effort to alleviate early life differences across socioeconomic groups.
Indeed, early childhood investments are often seen as the means par excellence to equalize
life chances (e.g. Blau and Currie 2006). To illustrate the usefulness of our framework
for policy evaluations, we now apply it to evaluate the long term impact of a large scale
child care reform in Norway.
The Kindergarten Act passed the Norwegian parliament in June 1975. It assigned
responsibility for child care to local municipalities and was followed by large increases
in federal funding. The reform constituted a substantial positive shock to the supply of
subsidized child care, which had been severely constrained by limited public funds. The
child care coverage rate for 3 to 6 year olds increased from less than 10 % in 1975 to over
28 % by 1979.22
Our objective is to assess whether the expansion of child care equalized opportunity
among Norwegian children. The outcome variable we focus on is individual yearly earn-
ings at age 30–36. Our circumstance variable is parental earnings during early childhood.
Havnes and Mogstad (2011) show that the child care expansion had, on average, posi-
tive long-run effects on children’s education and labour market attachment. Havnes and
22For detailed information about the program and for descriptive statistics, see Havnes and Mogstad
(2011).
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Mogstad (2015) document that the effects were highly heterogenous: gains were clus-
tered in the lower end of the overall earnings distribution, and were on average larger
for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Whether the distribution of gains for dis-
advantaged children dominates the one of advantaged children remains however an open
question.
We extend on Havnes and Mogstad (2015) by looking at the full distributional conse-
quences of the child care expansion within family background, and by bringing the EZOP
framework to bear on these results. Specifically, we examine to what extent the expansion
of child care equalized children’s earnings distributions as adults, conditional on parental
earnings deciles.
4.1 Empirical implementation
Assessing whether the Kindergarten Act equalized opportunities across Norwegian chil-
dren requires two sets of outcome distributions: For each circumstance, the distribution of
observed outcomes by family background among children who have experienced the child-
care expansion, and the counterfactual distribution that would have prevailed in absence
of the reform. Following Havnes and Mogstad (2015), we apply a difference-in-difference
(DiD) approach, exploiting that the supply shocks to subsidized child care were larger in
some areas than in others. Specifically, we compare the adult earnings of children aged 3
to 6 years old before and after the reform, from municipalities where child care expanded
a lot (i.e. the treatment group) and municipalities with little or no increase in child care
coverage (i.e. the comparison group).
We focus on the early expansion, which likely reflects the abrupt slackening of con-
straints on the supply side caused by the reform, rather than a spike in the local demand.
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We consider the period 1976–1979 as the child care expansion period. To define the treat-
ment and comparison group, we order municipalities according to the percentage point
increase in child care coverage rates over the expansion period. We then separate the
sample at the median, letting the upper half be treatment municipalities and the lower
half be comparison municipalities. To define the pre-reform and post-reform groups,
we exploit that children born 1967–69 enter primary school before the expansion period
starts, while children born 1973–76 are in child care age after the expansion period has
ended. Havnes and Mogstad (2011, 2015) show that the expansion of child care is not
explained by observable characteristics.
To assess the impact of the reform on the distribution of children’s earnings, condi-
tional on parental earnings, we estimate the following equation:
1 {yit ≥ y} = γt(y) + [β0(y) + Pt · β1(y) + Ti · β2(y) + Ti · Pt · β3(y)] · xit + it(y), (6)
where 1 {·} is the indicator function, yit are average yearly earnings in 2006–2009 of child
i born in year t, and y is a threshold value of earnings discussed below. Ti is a dummy
equal to one if the child is from a treatment municipality and zero otherwise, and Pt is
a dummy equal to one for post-reform cohorts (born 1973-76) and zero for pre-reform
cohorts (born 1967-69). γt is a birth cohort fixed effect, and  is the error term. The
vector xit contains a fourth-order polynomial in the average yearly earnings of the child’s
parents when the child was in child care age, that is x′it = (xit, x
2
it, x
3
it, x
4
it).
23 Vectors
β0 (y), β1 (y), β2 (y) and β3 (y) have dimension (1× 4).
The vector β3 (y) provides DiD-estimates of how the reform affected the earnings
distribution of exposed children. In the spirit of standard DiD, the estimator uses the
23We tested alternative polynomial specifications without any appreciable impact on results.
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observed change in the distribution around the value y, from before to after treatment,
as an estimate of the change that would have occurred in the treatment group over this
period in the absence of treatment. The identifying assumption is that the change in
population shares from before to after treatment around a given level of earnings would
be the same in the treatment group as in the comparison group, in the absence of the
treatment.24
Note that equation (6) allows for heterogeneity in the effect of the reform on the
distribution of earnings along two dimensions. First, β3(y) is a function of the threshold
earnings so the effect of the reform is allowed to vary along the earnings distribution of
the children. Second, since β3(y) is interacted with a polynomial in parental earnings
(xit), the effect of the reform is allowed to vary according to family background.
Equation (6) provides estimates defined in terms of changes in probability mass at
each value y. From these, we can compute the change in earnings induced by the reform
by rescaling with an estimate of the density at y (Firpo et al. 2009). When y is a quantile,
this yields an estimate of the quantile treatment effect (QTE).
Our EZOP criterion rests on a comparison of the effects of the reform at quantiles
of the earnings distribution conditional on circumstances. For each circumstance c and
each quantile p ∈ [0, 1], define Q1(p|c) = F−1(p|c, T = 1, P = 1) as the value of the
pth quantile in the actual distribution of earnings among treated children, conditional on
circumstances. The estimated QTE at quantile p for children with circumstances c is
defined as:
QTE(p|c) = E [β3(Q1(p|c)) · xit|Cit = c]
f (Q1(p|c)|Cit = c) (7)
24The estimator may be regarded as a RIF-estimator, see Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) for a
discussion. For a discussion of non-linear difference-in-differences methods, see Athey and Imbens (2006)
or Havnes and Mogstad (2015).
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where Cit denotes the circumstances of individual i born in cohort t, and f (·|·) denotes
the density of the earnings distribution F (·|·). Because QTE(p|c) estimates the impact
of the treatment, we readily construct an estimate of the counterfactual quantile in the
absence of treatment as Q0(p|c) = Q1(p|c)−QTE(p|c).
In the empirical application, we use the earnings decile of the child’s parents to de-
fine circumstances. Parental earnings are used here as a catch-all measure of individual
circumstances.25 We estimate equation (6) using OLS at each percentile of the earn-
ings distribution conditional on circumstances.26 We then use a kernel estimate of the
density from this distribution to construct our estimate of QTE(p|c). Our estimation
sample is based on Norwegian registry data and covers children born to married mothers,
who constitute about 93% of the relevant cohorts. Standard errors are obtained using
a non-parametric bootstrap with 300 replications. Based on our estimates of the actual
and counterfactual outcome distributions and on the bootstrapped covariances, we im-
plement stochastic dominance tests, along the lines of Andreoli (2018), as discussed in
the appendix.
4.2 Results for three classes
Defining children’s circumstances from parental earnings deciles involves a large number
of pairwise comparisons. To clarify the intuition behind the comparisons, we first focus
on three types in the population: Children whose parents had earnings in the second, the
fifth and the ninth decile, respectively. For expositional simplicity, we will refer to these
25While there are several other candidates to measure circumstances, these are typically strongly
correlated with parental earnings. Indeed, Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) show that parental income per se
is the most important characteristic among a large set of family circumstances. An advantage of our
relatively simple measure is also that the circumstances have an immediately natural ranking, that would
break down if interacted with e.g. parental education.
26In practice, we omit the bottom five percentiles to avoid issues of measurement error, and the top five
percentiles to avoid problems arising from lack of overlap in the conditional distributions. We therefore
run 90 regressions for each of the ten circumstances.
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simply as lower class, middle class and upper class children.
We start by analyzing the extent of inequality of opportunity before the implemen-
tation of the child care expansion. Panel (a) in figure 1 presents the counterfactual
distributions Q0(p|c) that would have been observed in the absence of the policy (pi = 0).
The figure shows first order stochastic dominance when we compare any pair of distri-
butions. This indicates that equality of opportunity is clearly violated. Furthermore, for
all preferences, there is a clear ordering of family types, with upper class children doing
better than middle class children, and middle class children doing better than lower class
children.
Panel (b) in figure 1 shows the impact of the child care expansion on the earnings
distribution of children in these three groups. The dashed line presents the QTE for
middle class children. Overall, the effect of the child care expansion in this group is
relatively modest. However, there is significant heterogeneity in the impact of the policy:
within the middle class, effects are positive in the bottom of the earnings distribution,
and turn negative in the upper end of the distribution. The dotted line gives the effect
on upper class children. In this group, the reform has a modest positive impact for
children in the bottom of the conditional distribution but a large negative impact in
the top of the distribution. Finally, the solid line provides estimates of the effect of the
child care expansion for lower class children. On average, lower class children seem to
benefit more from the child care expansion than children from middle and upper class.
Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the effect of child care stands in marked contrast with
what was observed in the other two groups: Among lower class children, the reform had
a small positive effect in the bottom of the distribution but had an increasingly large
and positive effect as we move up the conditional earnings distribution. This suggests
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two likely conclusions. First, on average, child care appears substitutable with parental
resources, captured here by the class of origin. Second, the impact of child care seems
complementary to the child’s idiosyncratic resources, within the lower class, while the
opposite seems to be true in the middle and upper class.
Panel (c) of figure 1 presents the conditional distribution of earnings after the policy
implementation (pi = 1). The figure shows first order stochastic dominance when we
compare any pair of distributions. Hence, equality of opportunity is rejected, even after
the implementation of the reform. However, compared to panel (a), the gap between any
pair of curves seems to have fallen at almost every quantile of the earnings distribution,
suggesting that the child care policy might have partially equalized opportunities across
the three classes.
To implement our EZOP procedure, we present in panels (d)–(f) the estimated gap
curves from pairwise comparisons of children from different family types under both social
states, alongside gap curve differences between these states with a 99% confidence interval
band. Since the conditional distributions can be ordered according to first order stochastic
dominance, we may invoke proposition 2: Gap curve dominance provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity.
Two main features stand out. First, in both social states, gap curves are virtually
always positive. This reflects the fact that all groups are ordered according to stochastic
dominance both with and without the child care reform. Second, the actual gap curve
(pi = 1) is almost always below the counterfactual gap curve (pi = 0). This indicates
that the reform reduced inequality of opportunity between all pairs of types. This fact
is clarified by looking at the gap curve differences: While the difference is small and not
statistically significant at the bottom of the distribution, the difference becomes positive
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Table 1: Joint dominance and equality tests for actual and counterfactual children earning
distributions and gap curves, for selected parental earnings deciles
Pairwise comparisons of social classes:
Lower vs middle Lower vs upper Middle vs upper
A - Cdfs, counterfactual setting (pi = 0)
H0 : ∼ 72.9 [ 0.000] 659.4 [ 0.000] 384.2 [ 0.000]
H0 : < 72.9 [ 0.000] 659.4 [ 0.000] 384.2 [ 0.000]
H0 : 4 0.0 [ 0.944] 0.0 [ 0.949] 0.0 [ 0.947]
B - Cdfs, actual setting (pi = 1)
H0 : ∼ 40.1 [ 0.003] 423.7 [ 0.000] 266.3 [ 0.000]
H0 : < 40.1 [ 0.000] 423.7 [ 0.000] 266.3 [ 0.000]
H0 : 4 0.0 [ 0.949] 0.0 [ 0.952] 0.0 [ 0.948]
C - Gap curves (pi = 0 vs pi = 1)
H0 : Neutrality 84.2 [ 0.000] 266.4 [ 0.000] 125.0 [ 0.000]
H0 : Equalization 4.8 [ 0.672] 11.2 [ 0.381] 9.1 [ 0.468]
H0 : Disequalization 76.0 [ 0.000] 248.4 [ 0.000] 112.0 [ 0.000]
Note: The table reports Wald-test statistics and associated p-values (in brackets) for various null hy-
pothesis, comparing the earnings distribution of lower, middle and upper classes. In panels A and B, for
each of the three pairs of classes, we test the following three null hypothesis: equality of the cdfs (∼),
first order stochastic dominance of the worse-off class over the well-off class (<) and first order stochastic
dominance of the well-off class over the worse-off class (4). In panel C, for each pair of classes, we
compare gap curves under the actual and counterfactual states and test three null hypothesis: the gap
curves are statistically equal (neutrality); the gap curve in the counterfactual policy state is everywhere
larger than in the actual policy state (equalization); the gap curve in the counterfactual policy state is
everywhere smaller than in the actual policy regime (disequalization). Gap curves are defined according
to the order of groups estimated from panels A and B. Covariances are bootstrapped. Joint tests are
performed on ventiles of child earnings distributions. In panels A and B of table 1, the values of the tests
statistics taken under the null hypothesis of equality and dominance coincide. This is a consequence of
the definition of the test statistics presented in the appendix.
and strongly statistically significant as we move up in the distribution.
The formal assessment of EZOP rests on joint tests of stochastic dominance, in each
pairwise comparison of groups, for (i) the actual distributions, (ii) the counterfactual
distributions and (iii) the gap curves. Results of these tests are presented in Table 1.
Panel A and B present test statistics for the counterfactual and actual settings, respec-
tively. We test three distinct hypotheses: the first is that distributions of the two groups
are equal; the second is that the distribution of the underprivileged group first order
stochastic dominates the distribution of the privileged group; the third is the reverse of
the second hypothesis. Not surprisingly, only the third hypothesis cannot be rejected in
all comparisons.
Finally, panel C presents the main tests of equalization of opportunity. First, the null
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hypothesis is that the reform had no impact on inequality of opportunity (neutrality).
This hypothesis is strongly rejected by the data. Second, the null hypothesis is that
the reform equalized outcomes across children from different classes (equalization). This
hypothesis cannot be rejected by the data, with p-values above 0.38. Third, the null
hypothesis is that the reform disequalized outcomes, increasing inequality of opportunity.
In this case, we can again strongly reject the hypothesis in all comparisons.
To summarize, the analysis shows first that the ordering between children from dif-
ferent classes in terms of their labor market performance is quite clear in Norway: Upper
class children dominate middle class children who dominate lower class children. Second,
the analysis shows that the child care reform in 1975 did indeed equalize substantially
the opportunities across children from different classes. Using the Gini-type evaluation
function, we can quantify the effect of the policy. For low and middle classes, results
indicate that the reform had a positive effect: Their opportunities increased by 4.3% and
3%, respectively. In contrast, the value of the opportunity set of the upper class increased
only by a modest 1%, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. This differential in
growth rates indicates that the lower and middle classes benefited from the policy reform,
both in absolute and in relative terms, in the sense that they caught up with the upper
class.27 Third, the QTE estimates show that this equalization came both from positive
impacts at the lower end of the distribution and from negative impacts at the upper end
for many children. This raises a concern about the universal design of the child care
expansion, as discussed in Havnes and Mogstad (2015).
27The difference and bootstrapped t-statistics (in parenthesis) between lower and middle classes are
0.0073 (3.091); between lower and upper classes is 0.0206 (3.185) and between middle and upper classes
is 0.0133 (2.693).
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4.3 Results for all parental earnings deciles
We now consider the entire population of children and extend the above group-comparisons
to all ten deciles of the parental earnings distribution. The results of the same series of
tests as in table 1 are summarized graphically in figure 2. In each panel, colored squares
summarize the results of the tests of the hypothesis of dominance of the groups on the
vertical axis over the groups on the horizontal axis. The shading of the squares indi-
cates the p-value for the rejection of the null hypothesis of dominance. Dark squares
indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of dominance (i.e. high p-values), while light
squares indicate rejection of the null hypothesis. We also test for equality of the distribu-
tions across groups, and indicate failure to reject equality with a black bullet inside the
square.28
Panels A and B of figure 2 report the results of dominance tests in the counterfactual
and in the actual states. In both states, the results suggest a strong monotonic relation
between parental earnings and the earnings advantage of children. Above the diagonal,
we universally fail to reject the hypothesis that the earnings distribution of children from
higher parental deciles dominates that of children from lower parental deciles. Below the
diagonal, we do reject that the earnings distribution of lower-decile children dominates
that of higher-decile children virtually everywhere. The only exceptions are three central
comparisons around the diagonal, where the differences in parental earnings across groups
is rather small, and equality cannot be rejected. Overall, these tests provide clear evidence
28To illustrate the construction of the figure, compare with the analysis with only three classes, in the
previous section. The squares in row 2, column 9, and in row 9, column 2, compare children from lower
class (D2) to children from upper class (D9). These squares represent p-values for the joint tests in the
central column of table 1. Consider panel A of figure 2, where we test for dominance in the counterfactual
setting. The dark color in row 9, column 2 indicates the failure to reject dominance in the third line of
panel A in table 1. Similarly, the light color in row 2, column 9 indicates the rejection of dominance
in the second line of panel A in table 1. The absence of bullets in both blocks indicates that we reject
equality of the earnings distributions, as in the first line of panel A in table 1.
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of inequality of opportunity for earnings among Norwegian children in both states.
We now turn to the test of equalization of opportunity. Panel C of figure 2 reports the
results of gap curve dominance tests for all pairs. For two thirds of the comparisons (29 out
of 45) we find the following pattern: Below the diagonal, we do not reject an improvement
in the position of the less advantaged children compared to more advantaged children.
Above the diagonal, we do reject an improvement in the position of the more advantaged
children compared to less advantaged children. Hence, these results indicate that, in
most pairwise comparisons, the implementation of the policy significantly decreases the
opportunity gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged type.
There are, however, two main exceptions. For ten pairs we fail to reject both equaliza-
tion and disequalization.29 We also find that the gap curves are statistically equal before
and after, which indicates that the policy left inequality of opportunity unchanged. Thus,
for these pairs, the condition of proposition 2 is also weakly satisfied. The second excep-
tion is the comparison of group D1 to groups D3 to D9. In these cases, we reject both
the hypothesis of equalization and the hypothesis of disequalization of opportunity. The
tests are thus inconclusive: We do not find gap dominance in any direction.
To summarize, we find that pairwise equalization of opportunity is satisfied in 85% of
cases. However, most of the comparisons involving D1 are inconclusive, as we can conclude
neither in favor of equalization nor disequalization. Taken together, the condition stated
in proposition 5 is not satisfied for first order stochastic dominance.
The inconclusive results for group D1 arises from the fact that gap curves intersect.
To go beyond, we may investigate the existence of higher order dominance. In our data,
we find that the integrated gap curve of order 3 before the policy is dominated by the gap
29The pairs are all the adjacent pairs except those involving D1, and the pair D3-D5 and D8-D10 pairs.
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Figure 3: Equalization of opportunity across parental earnings deciles.
Note: The figure reports, for every percentile of the sons earnings distribution, the differences in QTE
associated to pairs of different groups, i.e. the difference between the gap curves of the two types. Disjoint
tests of equality of the QTE are performed using bootstrapped standard errors. Differences in QTE that
are statistically indistinguishable from zero are reported in gray. Groups are ordered according to ISD
at order one. Out of 10 groups of parental earnings, 45 pairs of comparisons are performed at every
percentiles of the sons earnings distribution.
curve after the policy in the comparison of group D1 to groups D3-D9. This implies that
for all preferences in class R3, the child care reform caused disequalization of opportunity
for the most disadvantaged group (see appendix). In summary, in our application with 10
types, all preferences in the class R3 agree in the assessment, over all pairs, of pair-wise
EZOP (definition 1). However, the global EZOP condition (proposition 5) is not satisfied
in the class R3 (nor in any subclass), as there are pairs for which equalization unambigu-
ously prevails and pairs were disequalization is unanimously found. This suggests that
EZOP in definition 2 might be difficult to satisfy with a large number of types.
To overcome this lack of unanimous judgment on equalization of opportunity, one
may resort to a specific inequality of opportunity index. Using the Gini Opportunity
index of Lefranc et al. (2008), we find that unfair inequality decreased by 8.8% as a result
of the expansion in kindergarten provision.30 This comes as no surprise considering the
30The Gini Opportunity indices (standard error) are GO(0) = 0.0358 (0.0013) and GO(1) = 0.0326
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large number of pairs where equalization of opportunity is found.
Lastly, it is worth analyzing what parts of the distribution contribute to changes in
the gap between pairs of groups. To clarify this point, figure 3 reports the difference
between gap curves in the actual and counterfactual state, for each percentile of the chil-
dren’s earnings distribution. At each percentile of the conditional earnings distributions
of the children, we report the difference between the gap curves at that percentile from
each of the 45 comparisons below the diagonal in panel C of figure 2. Black dots indicate
gap curve differences that are statistically significant at the 1% level. Figure 3 shows
that equalization among most of the groups is driven not by a reduction in the gap at
the bottom end of the children’s distributions, but rather by a narrowing of the gap in
the middle and upper end of the distributions. This is explained partly by the fact that
estimated effects are rather homogenous across groups at the lower end of the distribu-
tion, and partly by the fact that the negative QTE-estimates at the upper end of the
distribution are particularly large for advantaged groups.
5 Concluding remarks
The first contribution of this paper is theoretical. We develop a new criterion for ranking
social states from the equality of opportunity perspective. Our criterion for equalization
of opportunity entails a difference-in-differences comparison of outcome distributions con-
ditional on circumstances. First, types are compared within each social state separately,
to assess the direction and distribution of unfair advantage across all possible pairs of
types. Second, differences are taken between social states in order to assess changes in
the extent and distribution of unfair advantage.
(0.001). The p-value for H0 : GO(0) = GO(1), based on bootstrapped standard errors, is 0.029.
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We propose an innovative model based on comparisons of changes in the economic
distance between pairs of distributions. Our criterion requires unanimity, within a large
class of preferences, in the evaluation of the fall in the illegitimate advantage enjoyed by
one type with respect to another. We study identification procedures and implementation
issues, showing the equivalence of our EZOP order with gap curve dominance. In cases
where the ordering of types is not unanimous, we proceed by minimally refining the set of
potential preferences until agreement is reached. We show that this refinement is easily
implementable using inverse stochastic dominance tools. While pair-wise agreement can
always be reached for a subset of preferences, agreement across all pairs of types can be
challenging to reach when the number of types is large. In such cases, the EZOP crite-
rion can be inconclusive and indicate equalization for some pairs and disequalization for
others. The criterion remains, however, informative of which type is driving opportunity
disequalization. The robust inequality of opportunity criteria, when inconclusive, can
also be aggregated into inequality of opportunity indicators.
Our results extend to the equality of opportunity framework some important results
in social welfare ordering. Several authors have demonstrated the equivalence between
stochastic dominance orders and social orders in a welfarist context (Kolm 1969, Atkinson
1970, Shorrocks 1983, Aaberge et al. 2014). Instead of focusing on inequality of outcomes,
as in the welfarist approach, our social order criterion is based on modern theories of
distributive justice (see also Peragine 2002) and extends this approach to inequality of
opportunity measurement.
Our second contribution is to provide a statistical framework that allows to implement
our equalization of opportunity criterion. Our application also underlines that economet-
ric models allowing for heterogenous effects can be tightly connected to the normative
40
assessment of distributional issues. The recent econometric literature has provided impor-
tant tools for estimating the heterogenous impact of policy intervention on some outcome
of interest.31 Since our equalization criterion can be expressed in terms of restrictions on
quantile treatment effects, this paper suggests a simple way in which these estimates can
be used to assess whether a given policy helps to promote distributive justice.
The third contribution of this paper pertains to the empirical analysis of the effective-
ness of early childhood intervention at equalizing life chances. Growing evidence on the
role of family background on lifelong earnings potential (Bjo¨rklund and Salvanes 2011,
Black and Devereux 2010) has brought educational policies to the forefront as potential
tools for alleviating differences stemming from family background. This has taken par-
ticular prominence due to theory and evidence suggesting that skills formation early in
life may be crucial in determining children’s trajectories (Cunha and Heckman 2007).
Expanding access to quality child care may be expected to equalize opportunities among
treated children, by weakening the dependence between family background and children’s
development. While studies of targeted programs often find positive effects (for a survey,
see e.g. Blau and Currie 2006), the literature on universal programs is smaller and find-
ings are mixed (see Havnes and Mogstad (2015) and references therein). We extend this
literature by providing evidence on the impact of a universally available large scale child
care program on long run equality of opportunity.
Applying our framework to evaluate the introduction of universally available child care
in Norway, we conclude that kindergarten expansion indeed equalizes opportunities among
children from most family backgrounds. Two important caveats should be noted. First,
echoing results in Havnes and Mogstad (2015), our results show that the equalization
31Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002), Athey and Imbens (2006) and Firpo et al. (2009), among others,
are important contributions to this literature. The RIF-DiD estimator of Havnes and Mogstad (2015)
belongs to the same econometric vein.
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of opportunity resulting from the reform is driven importantly by reduced earnings at
the upper end of the earnings distribution for affected children. An important question
is whether resources devoted to provide child care for children from upper class families
could be reallocated to improve quality or uptake of child care for lower class children.
Second, although there is strong agreement on equalization of opportunity for the
vast majority of groups, it is not possible to conclude completely in favor of equalization.
In fact, the policy seems to increase the gap for the least successful children in the
most disadvantaged group compared to most other types. This result indicates that the
Kindergarten Act produced relatively low returns for these children, leaving them even
further behind compared to the children from somewhat less disadvantaged backgrounds,
that benefitted handsomely. This finding casts a shadow on the effectiveness of universal
child care for the neediest children and deserves further investigation.
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